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Evaluating the Effectiveness 
of Labor Exchange Services
Christopher J. O’Leary
The fundamental goal of public employment programs is to pro-
mote nonsubsidized employment and earnings among participants.
Evaluations of a wide range of active labor market programs across a
variety of countries have produced three essential findings in this re-
gard: 1) job search assistance programs are the most cost-effective; 2)
large-scale public service employment programs are the least effective
and most costly; and 3) job training programs and employment subsi-
dies fall somewhere in between, with the degree of cost-effectiveness
dependent on proper targeting of assistance (Schwanse 2001, p. 22). 
A sizeable share of the research supporting these conclusions was
undertaken in the United States (Martin and Grubb 2001). However, ev-
idence from recent evaluations in Europe are consistent with American
studies, suggesting a broad applicability of lessons learned (Heckman,
LaLonde, and Smith 1999, p. 1868). 
With confidence bolstered by robust labor markets in the late 20th
century, and guided partly by evidence from evaluation research, many
nations moved their employment policies in the active direction (Thuy,
Hansen and Price 2001, p. 35). A popular initiative has been to increase
the level of job search activity expected for continued unemployment
compensation eligibility. 
This chapter examines evidence from U.S. evaluations of labor ex-
change activities. To set the context for this discussion, the next two
sections review the elements of the labor exchange function and the
composition of public labor exchange customers. This is followed by a
brief overview of methodologies for labor exchange program evalua-
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tion. The next three sections provide summaries of evaluation research
grouped into the main themes of studies which have been done: job in-
terview referrals, job search assistance, and targeted job search assis-
tance. The final section offers a summary and some conclusions.1
THE LABOR EXCHANGE FUNCTION OF THE PUBLIC
EMPLOYMENT SERVICE 
Public employment services around the world have four main func-
tions: 1) labor exchange; 2) administration of unemployment insurance
(UI) benefits; 3) management of active labor market programs; and 4)
labor market information (Thuy, Hansen, and Price 2001, p. 27). The
first of these is the main function of the federal–state Employment Ser-
vice (ES) in the United States. A crucial role of the ES in UI adminis-
tration is testing the continued job readiness of beneficiaries. 
Public labor exchange services in the United States are delivered
through a network of local offices that operate within a federal–state
system. The federal partner, the U.S. Employment Service (USES), co-
operates with 54 state ES agencies to oversee the system. In addition to
the 50 states, the network includes the District of Columbia, the Com-
monwealth of Puerto Rico, and the territories of Guam and the U.S.
Virgin Islands. 
The ES provides information to both the supply and demand sides
of the job market, which can increase the speed of matches between
qualified job seekers and employers wanting to fill specific job vacan-
cies. By bridging the information gap, and speeding matches, the level
of economic activity and employment can expand faster than otherwise
possible. 
The Workforce Investment Act of 1998 required the ES to be a part-
ner in one-stop centers for public employment services in each work-
force investment area around the country. There are currently about 600
workforce investment areas in operation. In addition to the ES, each
one-stop center must provide access to programs for UI; disadvantaged,
dislocated worker, and youth training; welfare-to-work; veterans em-
ployment and training; adult education; postsecondary vocational edu-
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cation; vocational rehabilitation; Title V of the Older Americans Act;
and Trade Adjustment Assistance. 
Services offered at one-stop centers are divided into three levels:
core, intensive, and training. Services within each level are character-
ized by the amount of staff involvement and the extent to which cus-
tomers can access the service independently. Core services typically
have the broadest access and the least staff involvement of the three cat-
egories. Intensive services require a greater level of staff involvement,
and consequently, access is generally more limited than for core ser-
vices. Training services involve the highest level of service intensity
and are open to customers only through referrals.
The core services are the least costly to deliver and include most ES
services; many are accessible on a self-serve basis. Table 5.1 provides
an overview of ES service use during the 1999 program year, which ex-
tended from July 1999 through June 2000. In that 12-month period at
the end of the 1990s business expansion, 16.7 million people applied
for public labor exchange services in the United States. Among those
Table 5.1  Public Labor Exchange Data for the United States PY 1999 
(July 1, 1999–June 30, 2000)











Referred to skills training 395,589 173,779
Entered employment 3,601,620 1,116,840
Placed 1,771,107 359,366
Obtained employment 2,029,411 822,906
SOURCE: U.S. Employment Service (2001).
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who applied, 65.5 percent received some reportable service; many oth-
ers availed themselves of self-service activities, which go unrecorded. 
The four categories of reportable services tracked by the USES
(and their percentage use among applicants receiving some reportable
service in program year 1999) are: 1) referred to employment—sent to
a job interview with an employer who listed a job vacancy opening
(61.5 percent); 2) received job search activities—resume preparation
assistance, job search workshops, job finding clubs, provision of specif-
ic labor market information, and development of a job search plan (61.3
percent); 3) assessment services provided—assessment interview, em-
ployment counseling or testing (16.2 percent); and 4) referred to skills
training—referred to any federal, state, or locally funded job skills
training program (3.6 percent).
In nearly all states, UI claimants must register for job search with
the ES in order to establish and/or maintain eligibility for weekly bene-
fits. This linkage between the UI and ES programs is part of what is
called the “work test” in UI, and it has been a key area of labor ex-
change evaluation research. Interventions which speed return to work
by UI beneficiaries can generate significant savings in UI benefit pay-
ment expenditures. 
Table 5.1 shows that in program year 1999, UI claimants made 
up 36.9 percent of ES customers. Column 3 of the table displays the
number of UI claimants using various reportable employment services.
Compared to all ES applicants, a smaller fraction of UI claimants actual-
ly received some reportable service. Among UI claimants, 71.1 percent
with some reportable service received job search assistance (JSA), com-
pared to 61.3 percent among all ES applicants. 
The higher JSA usage rate may be due in part to the Worker
Profiling and Reemployment Services (WPRS) systems that began op-
eration in all states in 1995. WPRS identifies UI claimants who are 
not job attached and who are likely to exhaust their UI benefit en-
titlement, and quickly refers them to job search orientation and assis-
tance. Benefit payments are suspended for those profiled and referred
who fail to report for job search. This targeted job search assistance 
is one of the evaluated program innovations discussed later in this
chapter. 
The bottom rows of Table 5.1 are a type of gross outcome perfor-
mance monitoring data. The outcome definitions are specific to the ES.
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“Entered employment” is the number of UI claimants who become em-
ployed after having received a “reportable service.” A “job placement”
occurs when someone begins employment after being referred for a job
interview. Those who “obtained employment” had received some re-
portable service other than direct referral to a job opening. When inter-
preting these results, it should be noted that most employers who solic-
it job seeker referrals from the ES require that more than one candidate
be sent for an interview. In the absence of such employer requests, the
placement rate would probably be higher. 
Establishing UI benefit entitlement requires a significant level of
recent employment and earnings. It means that UI beneficiaries have a
higher degree of prior labor force attachment than other ES applicants.
These two factors might explain the higher obtained employment rate
and lower placement rate among claimants compared to nonclaimants.
Employer attachment may make new job offers less attractive, and ob-
tained employment counts probably include return to prior employers
even after receiving some reportable service. 
However, such interpretation of gross outcomes is mere specula-
tion. The focus of this chapter is on comparison group design evalua-
tions. As stated in the introduction, the bulk of comparison group stud-
ies of labor exchange services have been in three areas: job interview
referrals, job search assistance, and targeted job search assistance. The
latter two of these have focused on UI claimants but are believed to
have broad applicability. 
CUSTOMERS OF THE LABOR EXCHANGE
The labor exchange serves both sides of the job market: job seekers
looking for work and employers looking to hire. This balanced cus-
tomer view is evidenced in the layout of the Internet-based public labor
exchange—America’s Job Bank (www.ajb.org). America’s Job Bank
(AJB) offers both job seeker and employer services customized for
each state and local labor market. 
AJB services available to the supply side of the labor market (job
seekers) include: searching a database of around one million jobs na-
tionwide, creating and posting a resume online, and setting up an auto-
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mated job search (or job scout). AJB services offered to the demand
side of the labor market (employers) include searching an extensive re-
sume database, posting available job openings, getting advice on writ-
ing job vacancy announcements, and conducting an automated search
for potential employees (a resume scout). In late August 2002, the Web
site listed the following inventory:
• Number of new jobs today: 28,566 
• Number of new resumes today: 270 
• Total jobs available: 938,611 
• Total available resumes: 408,790 
On the supply side of the labor market, labor exchange customers
can be divided into three distinct groups: 1) UI claimants who are re-
ferred to WPRS; 2) other UI claimants; 3) and ES applicants not eligi-
ble for UI. A summary of the background characteristics of ES appli-
cants during program year (PY) 1999 (July 1999 to June 2000) is given
in Table 5.2. This table contrasts PY 1999 ES customers with all unem-
ployed during calendar year 2000 in terms of demographic characteris-
tics. By gender and race, ES registration for job search occurs at rates
similar to the group proportions among all unemployed. However,
compared to their share among all unemployed, youth are a smaller
share of ES customers, while the less educated are a greater share of job
seeking customers. 
Labor exchange customers on the demand side of the labor market
are employers. About one-third of all U.S. employers use the ES for re-
cruiting employees (Holzer 1998, pp. 9–10). The distribution by indus-
try of the nearly 7.5 million job openings listed with the ES in program
year 1999 can be seen in Table 5.3. The table shows that industry shares
of job listings differ from industry shares of employment. There are ap-
preciably larger shares of job listings than employment for three partic-
ular industry groups: 1) agriculture, forestry and fisheries; 2) services;
and 3) public administration. Public administration probably has a high
listing rate because of government requirements for publicly posting
job vacancies. High usage rates for the first two industries listed may be
partly explained by high employee turnover rates in these industries,
but much of the differences across industries may be attributable to the
occupational mix of employment within industries. 
Employers in industries which tend to employ higher cost labor
may be more willing to incur direct monetary costs for job matching
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Table 5.2  Characteristics of Applicants for Employment Service
Programs, PY 1999 and Annual Average Monthly
Unemployed, 2000
ES applicants All unemployed
Number Percent Number Percent
Age—Youth (under 22) 2,305,938 13.8 1,303,000 23.0
Age—Older (over 54) 1,367,086 8.2 478,000 8.5
Gender—Female 7,710,699 46.1 2,701,000 47.8
Race—Black 3,588,649 21.5 1,269,000 22.4
Race—Hispanic 2,116,289 12.7 876,000 15.5
Education—Less than high
school
3,220,905 19.3 771,000 13.6
Education—Post–high school
degree/certificate
2,344,471 14.0 854,000 15.1
Total 16,708,228 100.0 100.0
SOURCE: U.S. Employment Service (2001) and <http://www.bls.gov/cps/home.htm>.
5,655,000
Table 5.3  ES Job Openings Listed by Industry, PY 1999 Average
Monthly Employment by Industry, 2000
Job openings Employment
Industry categories Listed Share Number Share
Agriculture, forestry, and fisheries 356,158 4.9 2,017,000 1.5
Mining 22,112 0.3 567,000 0.4
Construction 344,512 4.8 9,581,000 7.2
Manufacturing 964,456 13.3 18,970,000 14.2
Transportation and utilities 429,565 5.9 9,738,000 7.3
Wholesale trade 234,081 3.2 5,102,000 3.8
Retail trade 964,970 13.3 22,571,000 16.9
Finance, insurance, and real estate 223,802 3.1 8,797,000 6.6
Services 3,168,768 43.8 50,345,000 37.6
Public administration 524,800 7.3 6,125,000 4.6
SOURCE: U.S. Employment Service (2001) and <http://www.bls.gov/cps/home.htm>.
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services, because the costs associated with a poor match would be
greater for an employer paying higher wages. Similarly, job seekers in
higher-wage labor markets may believe that paying agency fees will
buy them access to preferred job opportunities. Low-paying jobs neces-
sarily trade in a market where transactions costs are low. Services of the
public labor exchange are provided for free. Because the ES provides
job-matching services free of charge, they may also be used by em-
ployers who can quickly and adequately assess qualifications objective-
ly through means like a resume, professional certification, licenses, or a
standardized test score. 
The occupational mix of job vacancies listed and filled by the ES in
PY 1999 are reported in Table 5.4. Job listings span the range of occu-
pations; however, the fill rates differ across occupations. The ES was
successful in filling more than 40 percent of job vacancy listings in
three occupational groups: domestic services, processing, and materials
handling. These figures square with the industry mix information. Do-
mestic services, other services, and package and materials handling are
all main occupations in the services industry. Processing occupations
are a major employment component of the manufacturing industry,
which is also a good customer of the public labor exchange. 
EVALUATING EFFECTIVENESS
Performance measurement of labor exchange activities, as dis-
cussed in Chapter 4 of this volume, concerns methods for tracking out-
comes experienced by program participants. Such data on gross pro-
gram outcomes are gathered in a consistent manner across all localities
on a regular basis. This information is the foundation for management
systems driven by objectives. Such information can help in program
planning and management.
In contrast to performance management systems, the evaluation
studies examined in this chapter all involve a comparison group design
which permits estimation of the incremental effect of an intervention.
The methodology, called net impact estimation, contrasts postprogram
labor market outcomes of participants against an appropriately chosen
counterfactual.
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Table 5.4  Job Opening Listings by Occupation Received and Filled by
the U.S. Employment Service, PY 1999
Job openings
Occupation categories Received Filled
Percent
filled
Professional, technical, and managerial 1,120,430 136,235 12.2
Clerical 1,479,820 312,961 21.1
Sales 585,145 100,511 17.2
Domestic services 50,643 23,227 45.9
Other services 1,194,364 269,169 22.5
Farming, forestry, and fishing 297,151 98,311 33.1
Processing 344,807 158,593 46.0
Machine trades 341,424 107,074 31.4
Bench work 387,940 142,793 36.8
Structural 604,813 178,433 29.5
Motor freight 206,861 55,249 26.7
Transportation 108,201 19,881 18.4
Package and materials handling 666,534 282,719 42.4
Other 64,541 15,814 24.5
Total 7,452,674 1,900,970 25.5
SOURCE: U.S. Employment Service (2001).
For evaluating labor exchange programs, this means that personal
and labor market characteristics enabling success are roughly equiva-
lent in the two groups. Appropriate comparison group specification can
be achieved by proper sample selection or through statistical means;
that is, either by classical field experiments involving random assign-
ment or by quasi-experimental statistical methods. 
Classically designed experiments are the ideal for net impact esti-
mation. If random assignment is achieved, modeling of behavior and
complex econometric methods are not needed to obtain estimates.2
With large samples randomly assigned to treatment and control groups,
observable and unobservable characteristics of the two groups should
not differ on average, so that any difference in outcomes may be attrib-
uted to the program. Program impacts may be measured as the simple
difference between the means of the samples of program participants
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and of control group members on measures of outcomes. Because this
process is easy to understand, impact estimates computed this way can
be very influential in informing policy.
When there is nonrandom assignment to either a program partici-
pant group or the comparison group, then to estimate the net impact of
a program properly, statistical methods of correction must be used to
offset selection bias. Such quasi-experimental evaluations are done be-
cause they are cheaper and can be done more quickly than classical ex-
periments. They can often be performed using existing administrative
data, which helps control evaluation costs. 
The main challenge in quasi-experimental net impact evaluations
concerns adequately dealing with the problem of selection bias. A pop-
ular approach to dealing with this problem was proposed by Heckman
(1976), who characterized selection as an unobservable variable distin-
guishing program participants from nonparticipants. Other approaches
involve strategically selecting a comparison group by matching charac-
teristics of program participants with nonparticipants who appear to be
otherwise similar. Such matching may be done on a set of characteris-
tics or on a single summary measure of several characteristics (Heck-
man, LaLonde, and Smith 1999). 
While performance monitoring of gross outcomes is a basis for
program management, net impact estimation is a basis for policy devel-
opment. Policy decisions concerning questions of whether to continue,
expand, curtail, or cancel government employment programs require
information about the return on government spending—the return on
investment. Such cost–benefit analysis of programs requires measure-
ment of net impacts. 
Net impact evaluations are not without potential problems, even if
the evaluation is done under the ideal conditions of a field experiment.
The first type of potential pitfall is called internal validity problems. In
the context of an experiment, internal validity problems include errors
in conducting random assignment to treatment and control groups, and
inconsistent experimental conditions. The first of these can lead to lack
of homogeneity across groups; the second means that the same treat-
ment was not applied in all cases. One problem of this type is called
dropout bias, wherein a customer believed to be provided an experi-
mental treatment in fact did not receive the service. The converse prob-
lem is called substitution bias, wherein a control group member actual-
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ly receives the treatment, but through an unobserved channel (Heckman
et al. 2000). 
The second type of evaluation pitfall is called external validity
problems. These affect the ability to transfer estimates from the evalua-
tion context to the actual policy context. Time horizon effects can occur
when treatment subjects understand that the experimental service is
only temporary rather than permanent. Learning effects can take place
within a community during the course of an evaluation whereby the
first enrollees act differently from those enrolled some time after the
evaluation begins. Entry effects not observed during an evaluation can
emerge when an appealing service becomes generally available to a
customer population. Hawthorne effects are responses to treatments
simply due to the special attention,3 not to the content of service. Dis-
placement effects, which may be the most critical external validity con-
cern, occur, for example, when participants in an evaluation improve
their outcome at the expense of others who are not part of the evalua-
tion.4
EFFECTIVENESS OF JOB INTERVIEW REFERRALS
The main activity of the public labor exchange in the United States
is job interview referrals. In PY 1999, 61.5 percent of customers na-
tionwide receiving an ES service were given a job interview referral.
About half of those customers were identified as subsequently entering
employment. However, such gross outcome assessments do not indi-
cate the value added by job interview referrals from the ES. 
In the past 20 years, three major studies of the ES in the United
States have estimated the additional value provided by job interview re-
ferrals from the public labor exchange (Johnson et al. 1983; Katz 1991;
Jacobson and Petta 2000). A summary of the designs, samples used,
and main findings from each of these studies is provided in Table 5.5.
Each of the three studies framed the question of job referral effec-
tiveness differently, but all three used a quasi-experimental approach.
Random trial evaluations were ruled out because job interview referrals
are a right to all ES applicants and cannot be denied simply to create a
control group for experimental measurement. In reviewing these stud-
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Table 5.5  Studies on the Effectiveness of Job Interview Referrals
Author/title Design Sample Findings
Johnson et al. (1983) A National 
Evaluation of the Impact of the 
United States Employment 
Service
P1: ES job referral 
P2: Early ES job 
referrral 




30 offices in 27 
states
July 1980 to 
May 1981 
8,000 ES applicants
P1: 23**% earnings gain for all 
women, UI claimants, and non-
claimants.  Nil impacts for men.
P2: Large earnings gains for women,
modest earnings gains for men.  
Among men, bigger effects for 
men over 45 and in urban areas. 
Comments: Displacement effects 
possible.  Results not affected by 
selectivity bias correction. Com-
parison group somewhat 
advantaged.  
Katz (1991) The Length of Job-
lessness and the ES: With 
Special Reference to Phila-
delphia and Pittsburgh, Penn-
sylvania 1979–1987.
P1: ES placements 
P2: ES job referral 
C: No ES services
Pennsylvania:
1979–1987
5% sample of UI 
recipients, 16,470 
jobless spells 
P1: Reductions in duration of job-
lessness increased with time delay 
in applying for ES.  Up to –23.7** 
weeks.
P2: Reductions in duration of job-
lessness increased with time delay 
in applying for ES.  Up to –20.5** 
weeks. 
Similar impacts in combination with 
JSA. Comments: Must control for 
delay in application, ES as a back-
stop, JSA most effective early.
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Jacobson and Petta (2000) Mea-
suring the Effect of Public 
Labor Exchange (PLX) Refer-
rals and Placements in Wash-
ington and Oregon.
P1: Job placements 
C1: Job referrals 
P2: Job referrals 
C2: Not referred
Washington: survey 
of 587 early 1998,
administrative 
data on 328,815 
spells, 1987 to 
mid-1995
Oregon: administra-




P1: Strong work record –7.2 weeks,
weak work record –3.8 weeks 
Washington administrative data:
P1: –7.7 weeks.  P2: –2.1 weeks
Oregon administrative data:
P1: –4.6 weeks.  P2: –1.1 weeks.
NOTE: P: participant group; C: comparison group. 
** Statistically significant at the 95 percent level in a two-tailed test.
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ies and their findings, we see how research has informed employment
policy in the United States. 
A National Evaluation of the ES in the United States
In the early 1980s, the U.S. Department of Labor sponsored a ma-
jor nation-wide evaluation of the effectiveness of the ES (Johnson et al.
1983; Johnson, Dickinson, and West 1985). Baseline interviews were
conducted with 8,000 new applicants in 30 ES offices nation-wide (in
27 states) between July 1980 and May 1981. To measure outcomes,
personal in-home follow-up interviews were conducted six to nine
months later.
Because not all ES registrants receive a reportable service, a natural
contrast for evaluation existed. Those who received ES services (partic-
ularly job referrals) were compared to those who did not receive re-
portable ES services. The latter group may have perused job vacancy
listings or done some other self-service activity. Success was measured
on two labor market outcomes: earnings and the time from ES applica-
tion to first job. 
Statistical tests for differences in observable characteristics be-
tween service recipients and non-recipients showed the two groups to
be quite similar. In fact, those not receiving ES services appeared to be
somewhat more job ready than service recipients. The researchers as-
serted that the slightly more advantaged comparison group imparted a
downward bias on estimated ES impacts. Estimates were computed
controlling for a long list of observable characteristics commonly mea-
sured for ES customers, and three additional variables were constructed
from responses to special quizzes administered for the evaluation proj-
ect. There was also an attempt to apply a Heckman (1976) type selec-
tivity bias correction; however, no suitable ES participation instruments
were found. That is, no variables adequately explained ES program use
independent of predicting subsequent labor market outcomes. After es-
timating impacts using a variety of sample definitions and statistical
techniques, the authors assert the estimates presented to be robust to a
wide range of alternative assumptions. 
Overall job interview referrals were found to be effective by in-
creasing earnings and reducing the time until return to work. However,
the bulk of these benefits were found to be concentrated among female
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users of ES services. A 23 percent increase in earnings was estimated
for female service users, who returned to work nearly three weeks
sooner than women not using ES services. The impacts for women
were similar regardless of whether or not they were UI beneficiaries.
The estimated impacts for men were nil.
A finer distinction in the treatment was also investigated. When the
job referral is soon after ES application, impacts are still large for wo-
men and become somewhat positive for men. For this early ES inter-
vention, two particular subgroups among men had larger impacts: those
over 45 and those in urban areas. There were no differences for men
who were union or job attached. Subgroup analysis revealed no differ-
ential effects between groups of women. About the effects for women,
the authors speculate that “[p]art of the reason may be that women have
less labor market experience and less access to the traditional network
of job finding methods and that an ES referral constitutes more of a ser-
vice for women” (Johnson, Dickinson, and West 1985 p. 136). In con-
cluding, the study authors cautioned that their analysis focused on only
partial equilibrium impact estimates and did not consider possible labor
market displacement effects or other general equilibrium aspects of im-
pact estimation. 
Effectiveness of the ES for Dislocated Workers in Pennsylvania
The National Commission for Employment Policy sponsored re-
search that exploited an uncommon feature of UI to estimate the effec-
tiveness of ES for dislocated workers in Pennsylvania (Katz 1991). The
study used data on UI recipients in Pennsylvania during the period
1979–1987. In those years Pennsylvania claimants were not required to
register for job search with the ES. Most states require ES registration
of UI claimants as part of their work test to reduce moral hazard
(Blaustein, O’Leary, and Wandner 1997, pp. 28–29). 
Program effects were estimated by comparing labor market out-
comes of ES users against nonusers of ES. ES users had lower prior
earnings and longer periods of joblessness but were otherwise observa-
tionally similar to nonusers of ES services. A 5 percent random sample
of Pennsylvania UI recipients during years 1979–1987 yielded quarter-
ly data on 16,470 jobless spells nearly equally split between the two
largest cities in the state (8,198 Philadelphia; 8,272 Pittsburgh). De-
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scriptive characteristics of claimants in the samples were similar across
cities. 
By using a sample of UI claimants, the study contributed to delib-
erations on policy for dislocated workers who emerged as an important
program target group in the wake of the 1980s restructuring wave. UI
beneficiaries tend to have higher recent earnings and a stronger labor
force attachment than the average ES customer seeking work. This evi-
dence was viewed as a supplement to the national ES evaluation that
covered the entire pool of ES job seekers (Johnson et al. 1983; Johnson,
Dickinson, and West 1985). 
In addition to studying job interview referrals, the Pennsylvania
study also examined job search assistance (resume assistance, job
search workshops, job finding clubs, labor market information, and job
search planning) and job placements. Methods for measuring effects of
the latter must be clearly stated, as a job placement can be considered
an outcome by itself. The effects of ES services given in a particular
quarter were checked in subsequent quarters. Essentially, the durability
of an ES job placement was measured against that resulting from other
avenues of job finding. Katz (1991, p. 22) states that “[i]t is important
to note that an ES placement does not automatically imply an end to
joblessness as defined for this study. If an applicant was placed in any
given quarter, he/she would need to remain employed in the subsequent
quarter to be re-employed.”
Net impact estimates were computed in regression models control-
ling for differences in observable characteristics. Investigation of the
timing of using ES services revealed distinct patterns in effects. Job
search assistance was most effective right after the start of a spell of
joblessness. It was estimated to save up to 8.4 weeks of joblessness if
used within the first calendar quarter following job separation. 
Both job placements and referrals were found to be most effective
two or three calendar quarters after commencement of joblessness. For
users after two quarters, placements shortened jobless durations by an
estimated 14.8 to 20.7 weeks, while referrals shortened durations by an
estimated 10.5 and 13.2 weeks. For users after three quarters, place-
ment impact estimates were as large as –23.7 weeks, and with impact
estimates for job referrals between –14.8 and –20.5 weeks. Given their
huge magnitude, all the estimates were statistically significant. Place-
ments or referrals combined with JSA were estimated to have similar
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effects. The direction of impact estimates for ES services is consistent
with other research, but the estimated magnitude of impacts is much
larger than anything else reported in the literature. 
The key insight gained from this study regards the response to in-
terventions at differing times in the jobless spell. The pattern that
emerged led the study author to describe the ES as a “backstop,” or a
job-finding path followed when others have yielded no appealing
prospects. “The effectiveness of the ES appeared to be much less a
function of the characteristics of individual workers than the overall
length of their joblessness” (Katz 1991, p. 21).
While results of this study are qualitatively consistent with other
ES evaluations, the size of the impact estimates are astounding, being
nearly three times as large as the ES impact estimate for women pro-
duced by Johnson et al. (1983) and Johnson, Dickinson, and West
(1985). Any government program producing such success would likely
be swamped with applicants and government funding.
Effectiveness of Referrals and Placements in Washington 
and Oregon
During the 1990s, the U.S. Department of Labor sponsored re-
search to estimate the benefits derived from matching job seekers to
openings listed by employers with the public labor exchange in Wash-
ington and Oregon. The study comprised investigations using three data
sets, two from Washington and one from Oregon. The data for Wash-
ington consisted of survey data on 587 job seekers who used the public
labor exchange in the first half of 1998, plus administrative data on
328,815 jobless spells that occurred between 1987 and the middle of
1995. The Oregon data were based on administrative records for
138,280 jobless spells in 1995. 
Analysis of job placements using the Washington survey data re-
vealed differences in impacts across ES customers depending on their
recent patterns of job attachment. For job seekers characterized as hav-
ing a spotty work record, the impact of a job placement was estimated
to be –3.8 weeks, while the impact estimate was –7.2 weeks for those
with a strong work record. 
Impact estimation based on the administrative data did not distin-
guish between job seekers with spotty or strong work records. The im-
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pact of job placements based on the Washington data was estimated to
be –7.7 weeks, and the estimate based on Oregon data was –4.6 weeks.
These estimates of job placement impacts based on administrative data
were viewed as broadly consistent with those from the Washington sur-
vey data. 
The impact of job referrals based on the Washington administrative
data was estimated to be –2.1 weeks, and the estimate based on Oregon
data was –1.1 weeks. An ES job placement can be distinguished from a
job referral by the resources required to deliver the service. Nonethe-
less, the estimated cost of delivering either referrals or placements was
low relative to impact estimates so that benefit–cost ratios were com-
puted to exceed one for both interventions. The authors assert this to be
sufficient justification for further public investment in ES activities.
Concern about the degree to which the Washington and Oregon ES
evaluations were externally valid regarding displacement led to a relat-
ed study. Davidson and Woodbury (2000) used a computerized simula-
tion model of the labor market called a general equilibrium search and
matching model (Davidson and Woodbury 1993). They calibrated the
model with labor market data from Washington State and with impact
estimates of Washington public labor exchange (PLX) services (Jacob-
son and Petta 2000). “The crowding-out effects of PLX referral and
placement activities are small both absolutely and relative to the in-
creases in employment that result from PLX activities . . . the benefits
generated by PLX referral and placement activities outweigh the costs.
The benefits again are twofold: shorter unemployment spells for PLX
users and general improvements in the labor market that result from
PLX activities” (Davidson and Woodbury 2000, pp. 19–20). 
EFFECTIVENESS OF JOB SEARCH ASSISTANCE
Job search assistance comprises a bundle of services available from
the public labor exchange which may include resume preparation assis-
tance, job-finding clubs, provision of specific labor market information,
development of a job search plan, and orientation to self-service re-
sources (job vacancy listings, resume preparation, word processor com-
petency testing, and telephones for contacting employers). In evalua-
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tions of JSA, job search workshops (JSW) are treated as a distinct ser-
vice. 
Three specific evaluations of JSA performed in the past 20 years
have been particularly influential in shaping public labor exchange pol-
icy. The designs, samples, and findings from these studies are given in
Table 5.6. All three evaluations were done as field experiments involv-
ing random assignment. As mentioned above, evaluations of job refer-
rals and placements have not applied an experimental design due to the
untenable design requirement of withholding from the control group
basic services having universal entitlement. Consequently, JSA evalua-
tions have focused on UI claimants and have usually involved provid-
ing additional services. 
It is well documented that in performing its income replacement
function, UI acts as a disincentive to rapid return to work (Decker
1997). The work test that links the UI and ES programs in the United
States is an institutional mechanism for monitoring whether UI benefi-
ciaries are available and actively seeking work. The JSA evaluations
have investigated various approaches to improving the effectiveness of
the work test for UI. 
Charleston Claimant Placement and Work Test Experiment
The first field experiment addressing aspects of the UI work test in
the United States began enrollment in February 1983 in Charleston,
South Carolina. Random assignment of 5,675 new initial UI claimants
to three treatment groups and a control group was completed in De-
cember 1983. The experiment was designed to evaluate new procedures
intended to improve the UI work test and enhance ES practices. The
three treatments tested represented successively larger bundles of ser-
vices. This design permitted contrasts against each other as well as
against the single control group. 
Claimants assigned to the control group were given the customary
work test, which involved informing claimants that ES registration was
required but involved no systematic monitoring of this requirement.
The three treatments in Charleston were:
1) A strengthened work test. This test required that an ES registra-
tion notice be sent after the first UI benefit check was paid,
154Table 5.6  Studies on the Effectiveness of Job Search Assistance
Author/title Design Sample Findings
Corson, Long, and Nicholson 
(1985) Evaluation of the 
Charleston Claimant Place-
ment and Work Test Demon-
stration
T1: Stronger work 
test 
T2: T1 plus en-
hanced placement 
services 
T3: T2 plus JSW 
C: Customary work 
test
Charleston, SC 




T1: –0.55* weeks UI 
T2: –0.61** weeks UI 
T3: –0.76** weeks UI 
Impacts greater on men and con-
struction workers.
Johnson and Klepinger (1991) 
Evaluation of the Impacts of 








C: Existing work 
search policy
Tacoma, WA 
July 1986 to August 
1987 
T: 6,763 C: 2,871
T1: +3.34** weeks UI 
T2: +0.17 weeks UI 
T3: –0.47* weeks UI 
Exits increased preceding required 
service participation.
155
Klepinger et al. (1998) Evalua-
tion of the Maryland Unem-
ployment Insurance Work 
Search Demonstration
T1: Report four em-
ployer contacts 
weekly 
T2: Two contacts re-
quired weekly, but 
no reporting 
T3: Report two con-
tacts weekly plus 
a four day JSW 
T4: Report two con-








but told data was 











T1: –0.7** weeks UI 
T2: +0.4* weeks UI 
T3: –0.6** weeks UI 
T4: –0.9** weeks UI 
Impacts identical against either con-
trol group, suggesting no Haw-
thorne effect present. Treatments 
1, 3 and 4 had no earnings im-
pacts. 
Treatment 2 raised earnings by 4** 
percent.
NOTE: T: experimental treatment group; C: experimental control group; JSW: job search workshop.
* Statistically significant at the 90 percent confidence level in a two-tailed test; ** statistically significant at the 95 percent level in a two-
tailed test.
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with payment of the second check suspended for failure to reg-
ister with the ES. This required establishment of improved data
sharing systems between UI and ES.
2) A strengthened work test plus enhanced placement services;
such as a personal placement interview within one week of the
first UI check, a job referral or an outreach attempt to contact a
prospective employer (job development), and training in using
the job vacancy listings. Treatment assigned claimants were
also told they would be called for special services again once
they drew nine weeks of benefits. 
3) A strengthened work test, enhanced placement services, a
three-hour JSW, and, after four weeks of UI benefits, a JSW on
labor market information.
The strengthened work test had the greatest impact. It alone short-
ened the duration of compensated joblessness by more than half a week;
the impact estimate was –0.55 weeks of UI benefits. This effect was sta-
tistically significant, but not significantly different from the estimated
effect of the second treatment. The addition of enhanced placement ser-
vices resulted in an impact estimate of –0.61 weeks, or an insignificant
increase over the strengthened work test alone. The impact estimate for
the third treatment, which added JSWs, was –0.76 weeks of UI benefits,
a modest incremental effect over either of the other treatments. 
Impacts of the treatments were concentrated among men who aver-
aged impacts of greater than –1.0 weeks for all treatments, and among
workers in the construction industry, who had impacts of over –4.0
weeks. The relatively low cost of treatments resulted in jaw-dropping
benefit–cost ratios in excess of 4. That is, more than $4.00 in UI benefit
payments were saved for every dollar spent on the work test, JSA, and
JSW services. The third treatment, which involved the largest number
of components, had an average cost of only $17.58 in 1983 dollars. 
In 1969 the UI trust fund was added to the federal unified budget.
Conservation of UI funds consequently improves the overall budget
picture. In the 1980s political environment of huge federal deficits, the
Charleston Claimant Placement and Work Test Experiment drew atten-
tion to the strengthened work test, JSA, and JSW as appealing policy
tools. These instruments offered the potential of providing positive ser-
vices while conserving UI trust fund dollars.
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Washington Alternative Work Search Experiment
Effects of the UI work test and related services of the public labor
exchange were further investigated by a field experiment with random
assignment between July 1986 and August 1987 in Tacoma, Washing-
ton, job service centers. A total of 6,763 UI claimants were assigned to
one of three treatments, and 2,871 claimants were assigned to the con-
trol group, which followed the existing Washington State work search
policy. 
The standard work search rule required three employer contacts per
week plus an eligibility review interview (ERI) 13–15 weeks after the
initial claim was filed. This ERI involved a one-hour group session fol-
lowed by a 15-minute individual interview. The focus of both sessions
was on UI eligibility. The three treatments in Tacoma were:
1) Exception reporting—a complete relaxation of the work test.
Claimants were not required to file the standard biweekly con-
tinued UI claim form, and were told that UI payments would
continue until the claimant reported a change in circum-
stances, such as return to work or an increased level of earn-
ings. 
2) New work search policy—individualized work search require-
ments, including a group ERI followed by an intensive one-on-
one follow-up interview. 
3) Intensive services—individualized work search requirements
(treatment 2), plus a two-day JSW after 4 weeks (two days of
classroom instruction plus 10 hours of phone canvassing), plus
a group ERI after 12 weeks with a focus on employability de-
velopment, plus individual follow-up. 
Suspension of enrollment into the first treatment was done earlier
than planned because the larger than expected response could easily be
detected with a sample much smaller than designed. Claimants were re-
lieved of the work test, and continued claim filing increased their weeks
of UI benefits drawn by a statistically significant 3.34 weeks. This im-
pact was bigger for women with children and men without children,
and for married women and unmarried men. 
The new work search policy providing custom-tailored services
and schedules had an effect on UI benefit receipt of +0.17 weeks, and
158 O’Leary
was statistically indistinguishable from the existing standard work
search rule applied uniformly to all claimants. 
Treatment number three, which was customized and had a JSW af-
ter 4 weeks and an ERI after 12 weeks, had a statistically significant
impact of –0.47 weeks. Impacts were bigger for women without chil-
dren and unmarried women. An analysis of the timing of the treatment
and claimant response (at 4 and 12 weeks), compared to the standard
treatment given the control group (at 13–15 weeks) provided new in-
sight into claimant behavior. Researchers observed suspension of UI
benefit receipt to be more common immediately before a scheduled in-
tervention rather than after the service was provided. Such a response
might be termed an “invitation effect.”
This led to the conclusion that the timed elements of the work test—
JSW and ERI—acted more like a stick-prodding return to work than a
carrot providing nourishment for achieving that end. The researchers
speculated that the response to treatment 2 had no identifiable peaks in
the timing of exit from UI receipt because the individually customized
schedule attenuated the observed response to an ERI invitation. 
Needless to say, exception reporting was estimated to be very cost-
ly. Individualized requirements generated no differential impact. An in-
vitation to attend either an ERI or JSW shortens duration, with the lat-
ter having a bigger effect. Exit rates are lower during and after the ERI
and JSW, suggesting it is the requirement to attend rather than the val-
ue of the session which shortens duration. 
Maryland UI Work Search Experiment
Enrollment into the Maryland UI work search experiment was con-
ducted in six public labor exchange offices around the state throughout
the entire calendar year of 1994. A combined sample of 23,758 new
monetarily eligible UI claimants were enrolled in the experiment. 
The standard work search policy was given to the control group.
This required two job search contacts per week, which must be report-
ed on the biweekly UI continued claim form but are not verified. The
four alternative treatments tested were:
1) Report four weekly employer contacts, which are not verified.
2) Contact two employers per week but need not report the two
contacted.
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3) Report two weekly employer contacts, which are not verified,
plus attend a four-day JSW early in the unemployment spell.
4) Report two weekly employer contacts; claimants are told con-
tacts would be verified. 
Requiring four employer contacts per week yielded a statistically
significant impact of –0.7 weeks of UI benefits. This reduction in dura-
tion resulted even in the absence of any verification of the offers. Re-
quiring two employer contacts per week but removing the requirement
to report them resulted in a statistically significant increase in UI bene-
fit durations of +0.4 weeks. The impact of requiring two employer con-
tacts per week, which were not verified, plus attendance at a four-day
JSW early in the unemployment spell was –0.6 weeks of UI. Like the
Tacoma experiment, this impact was due to raising the hassle associat-
ed with staying on UI, not due to increasing claimants’ job search skills.
Notable for employers, this third treatment also reduced the probability
of returning to the prior employer. 
Requiring two employer contacts to be reported and telling
claimants that their two contacts would be verified impacted UI benefits
by –0.9 weeks. The verification rate of 10 percent appeared to be an ad-
equate threat. Notably, the impact of this fourth treatment occurred dur-
ing the first spell of joblessness. Similarly, the first treatment generated
the bulk of its response during the first spell of joblessness in the bene-
fit year. 
The effects of treatments 1, 3, and 4 were not associated with low-
er reemployment earnings. However, eliminating the work search re-
porting requirement, as in treatment two, raises reemployment earnings
by a statistically significant 4 percent. 
A second control group facing the standard work test was also
tracked, but claimants assigned to this group were told that their behav-
ior was being tracked as part of an experiment. This was done to permit
testing for the presence of a Hawthorne effect. This is relevant in ensur-
ing external validity of the evaluation. If part of the treatment response
to a new work test is simply due to added attention on the work test,
then such an effect could quickly dissipate after actual implementation.
Impact estimates computed as a contrast between the participant group
and each of the two control groups were virtually identical, suggesting
the absence of any Hawthorne effect.
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EFFECTIVENESS OF TARGETED JOB 
SEARCH ASSISTANCE
Targeting of JSA surfaced as a policy option during the 1990s fol-
lowing the massive economic restructuring and worker dislocation of
the previous decade. Earlier research had identified JSA as a cost-effec-
tive tool for promoting return to work. The question of whether JSA
would be effective for those at risk of long-term unemployment was
evaluated in the context of a major field experiment in New Jersey
(Corson et al. 1989). Together with earlier evidence on JSA cost effec-
tiveness, results from the New Jersey experiment supported establish-
ment of the Worker Profiling and Reemployment Services (WPRS) sys-
tem, which required targeted JSA (Wandner 1994). 
Three subsequent studies have evaluated the effectiveness of target-
ed JSA. The first was undertaken around the time of WPRS start-up
with special accommodations made to ensure experimental integrity
(Decker et al. 2000). The other two evaluations were done in the con-
text of WPRS (Dickinson et al. 1999, 2002; Black et al. 2003). In this
section, we briefly review the design and findings of these studies. 
New Jersey UI Reemployment Experiment
Enrollment into the New Jersey UI Reemployment Experiment was
done between July 1986 and June 1987 (Corson et al. 1989). The sam-
pling frame for random assignment was set to target the evaluation to
dislocated workers claiming UI benefits. Characteristics screens were
set to construct the sampling frame. 
These conditions required that a claimant must receive a first UI
payment and that payment must be within five weeks of applying for
benefits, must be at least 25 years of age, must have worked for the pre-
UI claim employer for at least three years, may not be on standby
awaiting return to the previous job with a specific recall date, and may
not be a union hiring hall member. 
The first three of these eligibility conditions permitted the offer 
of an intervention early in the jobless spell; the second two ensured
that subjects of the experiment were well-established labor force mem-
bers separated from a long job attachment; the last two conditions pro-
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vided the potential for interventions to affect job search plans.
Claimants who are awaiting recall to their prior job and members of
union hiring halls are not required by the UI system to engage in active
job search. 
Random assignment sent 2,385 claimants to the control group and
8,675 to one of three treatment groups. All three treatments included
JSA, the first being JSA alone. The second treatment added job training
to JSA.5 The third treatment added a cash reemployment bonus to JSA.
The bonus was for reemployment within 11 weeks of the claim and was
a cash payment of half the remaining UI entitlement, with the initial of-
fer good for two weeks and then declining by 10 percent per week. The
bonus was not paid if return to work was a recall, or if the job was tem-
porary, seasonal, part time, or with a relative. For all three treatments, at
five weeks into the claim all were given JSA orientation, skills and ap-
titude testing, JSA workshop, and an assessment or counseling inter-
view.
During the benefit year, the impacts on weeks of UI benefit receipt
were –0.47, –0.48, and –0.97 for the three treatments, respectively. All
of these impacts were estimated with statistical significance. The cumu-
lative impacts on weeks of UI benefit receipt over the six years after the
initial benefit claim were –0.76, –0.93, and –1.72 for the three treat-
ments, respectively, with the impact from the third treatment estimated
with statistical significance (Corson and Haimson 1996). 
The New Jersey UI Reemployment Experiment demonstrated that
JSA targeted to claimants likely to be long-term unemployed had the
same cost-effective impact as that found for other groups of UI
claimants—about a half-week shorter UI receipt. The encouraging re-
sults for the bonus treatment led the U.S. Department of Labor to fur-
ther investigate the ideal design for a reemployment bonus offer (Deck-
er and O’Leary 1995). 
Job Search Assistance Experiment
The Emergency Unemployment Compensation Act of 1991 author-
ized the U.S. Department of Labor to conduct the “Job Search Assis-
tance Experiment.” The experiment was designed to evaluate whether
providing early JSA to claimants identified by statistical models as
likely to exhaust their UI benefit entitlements would be cost effective
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(Decker et al. 2000). During the planning stages of the evaluation to be
run in the District of Columbia and Florida, federal legislation leap-
frogged public policy analysis.
In 1993 President Clinton signed Public Law 103-152, which re-
quired state employment security agencies to establish and use a sys-
tem of profiling all new claimants for regular UI benefits. The Worker
Profiling and Reemployment Services (WPRS) system was intended to
identify UI claimants most likely to exhaust their regular benefits so
that they may be provided early reemployment services to make a faster
transition to new employment. 
The WPRS established a two-stage process. First, UI recipients
who are expecting recall or who are members of a union hall are
dropped. These groups are excluded because they are not expected to
undertake an active independent job search. Second, remaining UI re-
cipients are ranked by their likelihood of exhausting regular unemploy-
ment insurance benefits. Beneficiaries are then referred to early reem-
ployment services in order of their ranking until the capacity of local
agencies to serve them is exhausted. The early assistance is comprised
of at least eight hours of job search assistance, which usually includes
an orientation to self-help facilities available at the public labor ex-
change and a JSW.
The JSA experiment proceeded with enrollment in Florida between
March 1995 and March 1996 in 10 sites around the state where regular
WPRS operations were temporarily delayed. Random assignment in
Florida involved 8,071 claimants. In the District of Columbia, the ex-
periment counted as the federal district’s WPRS implementation. Ran-
dom-assignment enrollment to the JSA experiment was done in all pub-
lic labor exchange offices throughout the District between June 1995
and June 1996, and involved 12,042 claimants. 
The JSA experiment established an eligible pool of claimants using
a two-stage process: exclude job attached and union hiring hall mem-
bers, then evaluate the probability of exhausting UI entitlement and tar-
get those with highest probabilities for the evaluation. These claimants
were randomly assigned to control or one of three treatments. The treat-
ments were:
1) Structured job search assistance (SJSA): orientation, testing,
JSW, one-on-one assessment interview. Failure to participate
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could result in denial of UI benefits. Two additional visits with
staff to report job search progress.
2) Individualized job search assistance (IJSA): orientation and
one-on-one assessment interview. Individual plan developed
which may include additional mandatory services.
3) Individualized job search assistance with training (IJSA+):
identical to IJSA plus a coordinated effort with Economic Dis-
location and Worker Adjustment Assistance Act (EDWAA) staff
to enroll the customer in training. 
The impacts of the three treatments on weeks of UI compensation
in the benefit year in D.C. were –1.13, –0.47, and –0.61, respectively;
all estimated with statistical significance. Estimates of the same param-
eters in Florida were –0.41, –0.59, and –0.52, all of which were statisti-
cally significant. Both evaluations indicated that reemployment oc-
curred at wage rates similar to prior levels. The treatments had
generally positive and significant effects on earnings in DC, but no im-
pact on participant earnings in Florida.
Structured JSA emerged as the most cost-effective intervention ex-
amined. The authors of the evaluation report attributed the generally
larger impacts observed in DC to stricter enforcement of JSA participa-
tion requirements. They recommend making particular JSA services
mandatory and maintaining clear linkages between UI and ES in the
new one-stop environment under the Workforce Investment Act (WIA).
Evaluation of Worker Profiling and Reemployment Services
The first national evaluation of WPRS was based on data from two
sources: surveys in 1996 and 1997 of administrators in all states about
the implementation and operations of their WPRS systems, and
claimant-level data from a sample of states (Dickinson et al. 1999,
2002). 
Surveys were administered to officials in all states responsible for
UI, ES, and EDWAA programs, and state WPRS operations. These sur-
veys found that “by and large, states have met the legislated require-
ments for implementing WPRS systems and have generally followed
ETA guidance as well. Most of the major components of a WPRS sys-
tem are in place in all states” (Dickinson et al. 1999. pp. II-36). Fur-
thermore, it was found that over time states have refined WPRS systems
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by adding variables in statistical referral models and by increasing the
timeliness of referrals to services. 
For the claimant level data, states were chosen to represent varia-
tion in the intensity of reemployment services provided under WPRS.
The evaluation was performed using data drawn in six states: Connecti-
cut, Illinois, Kentucky, Maine, New Jersey, and South Carolina.6 For
each of these states, data were compiled from administrative records on
all UI claimants starting new benefit years between July 1995 and De-
cember 1996 who were eligible for referral to mandatory WPRS JSA.
That is, those with either a definite recall date or union hiring hall mem-
bership were removed from the sampling frame. The combined sam-
ples included 92,401 profiled and referred claimants, and 295,920
claimants who were profiled but not referred to WPRS JSA.
The quasi-experimental evaluation of WPRS impacts in each state
contrasted those profiled and referred to WPRS JSA against those pro-
filed but not referred. The mean impact estimate for each of the six
states on weeks of UI benefits drawn is reported in Table 5.7. These re-
sults suggest that WPRS modestly shortened the duration of UI benefit
receipt in five of the states examined. The impact estimates were statis-
tically significant in all states except South Carolina, where the impact
was not significantly different from zero. The largest impact was –0.98
weeks in Maine, with the other impacts ranging from –0.21 to –0.41
weeks of UI benefits. Furthermore, in the states studied, those referred
to mandatory WPRS had reemployment earnings on a par with those
profiled but not referred to services. 
Evaluation of the WPRS in Kentucky
While Kentucky was included among the states studied in the na-
tional evaluation of WPRS, an independent assessment of WPRS in
Kentucky based on an experimental design arrived at a much different
conclusion. The profiling model used in Kentucky was developed by
economists at the Center for Business and Economic Research at the
University of Kentucky (Berger et al. 1997). In working with the Ken-
tucky Department for Employment Services on the WPRS system, the
economists advocated a methodology for assignment to WPRS, which
provided ready data for an experimental evaluation of WPRS effective-
ness.
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Kentucky divides the predicted UI exhaustion distribution into 20
groups spanning 5 percentile points each. Every week the local WPRS
capacity is hit within one of the 20 groups. That group is referred to as
a profiling tie group (PTG). In Kentucky, profiled WPRS customers
within PTGs are randomly assigned to WPRS, or not. This is viewed as
an appropriate rule for referral to WPRS from a group of UI claimants
having scores that are not statistically significantly different. It also
provides the basis for evaluation of WPRS based on random trials. 
From the PTGs, experimental and control groups were formed by
the random trials to conduct an evaluation of the WPRS in Kentucky
(Black et al. 2003). Data were collected at the very beginning of WPRS
implementation in Kentucky from October 1994 through June 1996.
The PTGs yielded a total sample of 1,981 claimants, with 1,236 of
these assigned to mandatory WPRS JSA. Compared to the total popula-
tion of 48,002 profiled and referred Kentucky claimants in that period,
means of observable characteristics (age, schooling, gender, race, prior
earnings, weekly benefit amount) for the experimental treatment group
were not statistically significantly different from those in the control
group. 
The impact estimates for WPRS in Kentucky were dramatic. On
three outcomes of interest, the estimated impacts were: –2.2 weeks of
UI, –$143 UI benefits, and a $1,054 increase in earnings during the UI
benefit year. The difference in these estimates from the national WPRS
evaluation were most likely due to the fact that Black et al. (2003) es-
sentially confined their contrasts within PTGs, thereby achieving a
closer counterfactual. Dickinson et al. (1999, 2002) compared those as-
signed to WPRS who had the highest probability of benefit exhaustion
against all those profiled but not referred, including many with very low
exhaustion probabilities. As a result, the comparison group in the na-
tional evaluation was likely to have a shorter mean benefit duration than
program participants, even in the absence of WPRS services. 
The extraordinary foresight of the Kentucky Department of Em-
ployment Services to include randomization in assignment to WPRS
should be a model for all state and local employment service delivery
agencies. In setting up WPRS administrative rules, the Kentucky
agency realized the value of evaluation research and used that orienta-
tion to help resolve the resource allocation problem. When resources
are limited, randomization in program assignment can always be
166Table 5.7  Studies on the Effectiveness of Targeted Job Search Assistance
Author/title Design Sample Findings





T2: JSA plus train-
ing or relocation 
assistance 
T3: JSA plus a cash 
bonus 









T1: –0.47** weeks of UI 
T2: –0.48** weeks of UI 
T3: –0.97** weeks of UI 
6 Year T1: –0.76 weeks of UI 
6 Year T2: –0.93 weeks of UI 
6 Year T3: –1.72** weeks of UI
Decker et al. (2000) Assisting 
Unemployment Insurance 
Claimants: The Long-Term 
Impact of the Job Search 
Assistance Demonstration
T1: Structured JSA 
T2: Individualized 
JSA 
T3: T2 plus training 
C: Not on standby or 
a union hiring hall 
member, and pre-
dicted likely to 
exhaust UI enti-
tlement.
DC and Florida 
DC: June 1995 to 
June 1996 
8,071 claimants 
FL: March 1995 to 
March 1996 
12,042 claimants
DC T1: –1.13** weeks of UI 
DC T2: –0.47** weeks of UI 
DC T3: –0.61** weeks of UI 
FL T1: –0.41** weeks of UI 
FL T2: –0.59** weeks of UI 
FL T3: –0.52** weeks of UI
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Dickinson et al. (1999) Evalua-
tion of Worker Profiling and 
Reemployment Services: Final 
Report
P: WPRS profiled 
and referred to 
early JSA. 
C: Profiled but not 
referred (not on 
standby or a 
union hiring hall 
member)
CT, IL, KY, ME, NJ,
SC 




CT: –0.25** weeks of UI 
IL: –0.41** weeks of UI 
KY: –0.21* weeks of UI 
ME: –0.98** weeks of UI 
NJ: –0.29** weeks of UI 
SC: 0.02 weeks of UI
Black et al. (2001) Is the Threat 
of Reemployment Services 
More Effective than the Ser-
vices Themselves?  Experimen-
tal Evidence from the UI 
System
T: WPRS profiled 
and referred to 
early JSA. reem-
ployment services 
C: Profiled and in 
the same predict-
ed UI exhaustion 
cohort as T, but 
not referred to 
JSA.
Kentucky 




In the benefit year 
T: –2.2 weeks of UI,
T: –$143 UI benefits 
T: $1,054 earnings
NOTE: T: experimental treatment group; P: participant group; C: experimental control group or comparison group; JSW: job search work-
shop.
* Statistically significant at the 90 percent confidence level in a two-tailed test; ** statistically significant at the 95 percent confidence lev-
el in a two-tailed test.  
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viewed as an equitable mechanism. It has the added benefit of provid-
ing for very strong evaluation evidence.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
The ES is the public labor exchange in the United States. Its main
functions are job brokering and administration of the work test for UI
claimants. The work test requires UI claimants to make an active search
for a job, which may involve use of labor exchange services such as as-
sessment services, job search assistance, job interview referrals, and job
training referrals. As a job broker, the ES serves both sides of the job
market: job seekers looking for work and employers looking to hire. 
The job seekers served by the ES are similar to the universe of un-
employed in terms of gender and race. However, compared to their
share of all unemployed, youth are a smaller share of ES customers,
while the less educated are a greater share of job-seeking customers.
Among those registered with the ES, job seekers not eligible for UI
tend to use ES services more than UI beneficiaries. 
Employer services include public listing of job vacancies and
screening and referral of job candidates. Among U.S. employers, three
industry groups tend to have larger shares of job listings than employ-
ment: 1) agriculture, forestry and fisheries; 2) services; and 3) public
administration. Public administration jobs are listed at a high rate be-
cause of government requirements for publicly posting job vacancies.
High listing rates for agriculture and services may be partly explained
by high employee turnover rates, but much of the difference across in-
dustries may be attributable to the occupational mix of employment
within industries. Job listings span the range of occupations; however,
the ES fill rates differ across occupations. The ES was successful in fill-
ing more than 40 percent of job vacancy listings in three occupational
groups: domestic services, processing, and materials handling. 
Comparison group design evaluations of ES activities have focused
on three topics: 1) job interview referrals; 2) job search assistance; 3)
and targeted job search assistance.7 Each of the studies reviewed in this
chapter used a distinct research design, and some satisfied higher
methodological standards than others. Impact estimates differ across
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the studies because of methodology and also because the samples and
time frames for analysis differed. Nonetheless, each of the studies re-
viewed adds to our understanding of labor exchange services in the
United States; taken together, evidence from these studies has helped
shape the direction of public labor exchange policy. Research has guid-
ed development of programs for dislocated workers, targeted job search
assistance, and institutions for coordination of services, such as WPRS,
establishment of one-stop career centers, and state ERI programs as
part of the ES administered UI work test. 
Following is a list of key findings from ES evaluation studies:
• The first national evaluation of the ES in the United States found
that job referrals are most effective for women and are also ef-
fective for men over 45 years of age, and men in urban areas—
evidence for services to middle-aged dislocated workers (John-
son et al. 1983; Johnson, Dickinson, and West 1985).
• A study of ES effectiveness for dislocated workers in Pennsylva-
nia found JSA to be most effective early in a spell of joblessness,
and that ES job referrals act as a back stop once job seekers ex-
haust other avenues of search—evidence for early JSA interven-
tion (Katz 1991). 
• An evaluation in Washington and Oregon found ES job place-
ments most effective for those with a strong record of job attach-
ment, providing evidence for JSA as an intervention for dislocat-
ed workers (Jacobson and Petta 2000).
• Evaluation studies in South Carolina and Maryland found that a
stronger UI work test achieved by requiring reporting of job
search contacts and validation of contacts through cooperation
between UI and ES leads to significantly shorter periods of com-
pensated joblessness, providing evidence for the importance of
interagency cooperation (Corson, Long, and Nicholson 1985;
Klepinger et al. 1998). Such cooperation can be facilitated in the
one-stop career centers required by WIA in all local areas.
• A field experiment in Washington found that eliminating both
continued claim filing and the work test leads to dramatically
longer spells of compensated joblessness, providing further evi-
dence of the importance of UI and ES cooperation in requiring
and monitoring job search activity (Johnson and Klepinger
1991; 1994).
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• Evidence from evaluations in Maryland, Washington, DC, and
Florida demonstrated that standardized ERI and JSW are inex-
pensive to administer and have a sizeable effect on reducing pe-
riods of compensated joblessness—evidence in support of
WPRS and state-adopted ERI programs (Klepinger et al. 1998;
Johnson and Klepinger 1991; Decker et al. 2000).8
• Evidence from the New Jersey UI Reemployment Experiment
showed that JSA targeted to dislocated workers at risk of long-
term employment can be a cost-effective intervention and can be
very simple and structured. These results led directly to WPRS
implementation (Corson et al. 1989).
• Statistical targeting of JSA to those at risk of long-term jobless-
ness tested in DC and Florida through field experiments, provid-
ing further evidence supporting the cost effectiveness of targeted
JSA (Decker et al. 2000). 
• Recent evaluations of WPRS indicated shorter jobless duration
for program participants. An evaluation of WPRS in Kentucky,
applying an experimental design, found that WPRS shortens UI
duration by more than two weeks (Dickinson et al. 1999; Black
et al. 2003). 
All studies evaluating the effectiveness of ES interventions consis-
tently report very low costs per customer served by the public labor ex-
change. This fact is key to the cost-effectiveness of ES interventions.
Even services resulting in a modest reduction in jobless duration show
a significant return on public investment when costs are low. State and
local ES agencies should keep clear and reliable cost records to support
effective management, administration, and evaluation. 
Legislation authorizing employment and training initiatives nearly
always include both a requirement for program evaluation and a sunset
clause (O’Leary and Straits 2003). Employment policy makers at all
levels of government have an interest in knowing “what works.” Re-
search evaluating the ES has helped to affirm some ideas and discard
others. Public employment agencies benefit from evaluation research
and would be wise to keep such activity central to their operations. Fo-
cusing on results can improve professionalism among the staff and in-
crease customer satisfaction. The case of Kentucky using research prin-
ciples to set administrative rules in WPRS demonstrates exemplary
foresight. 
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A recent U.S. General Accounting Office (2003) report identified
the ES as the employment and training program serving the largest
number of customers. In fiscal year 2002, the ES served more than 19
million customers, a total more than seven times the next largest pro-
gram. In that same year, the ES budget ranked eighth among federally
funded employment and training programs. The evaluation studies re-
viewed in this chapter suggest that many services of the ES are cost ef-
fective; however, numerous other activities of the public labor ex-
change remain to be studied. 
The main evaluations to date have examined interventions directed
to job seekers. Policy and management of the public labor exchange in
the United States would benefit from research into the effectiveness of
services provided to employers as well. A variety of in-person services
provided by the ES have been found to be cost effective; however, public
labor exchange services are becoming increasingly automated. While
these services have received a steadily rising share of public labor ex-
change funding, the effectiveness of automated and self-serve assistance
provided by the ES is not well known and should be evaluated. Improved
data systems for tracking customers and services would greatly facilitate
proper evaluation of both employer and automated services. 
Evaluation research over the past 20 years on ES activities has con-
tributed greatly to the direction of public employment policy. It is now
standard practice for the Employment and Training Administration of
the U.S. Department of Labor to cite evaluation research findings when
providing policy guidance to states (DeRocco 2002). 
Notes
I thank David Balducchi, John Palmer, Helen Parker and Jeffrey Smith for valuable
comments on an earlier version. Opinions expressed are those of neither the W.E. Up-
john Institute nor the U.S. Department of Labor, but are my own. Errors and omissions
are mine as well.
1. Excellent previous summaries of ES evaluation research have been provided by
Jacobson (1991, 1995); Kulik (1995); Meyer (1995); Balducchi, Johnson, and
Gritz (1997); Fay and Lippoldt (1999); Grubb, Benes, and Lippoldt (2000); and
Thuy, Hansen and Price (2001). 
2. Heckman, LaLonde, and Smith (1999) enumerate the assumptions implicit in
such a view of random assignment field experiments as a means for model-free
impact estimation. 
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3. A Hawthorne effect is the initial improvement in a process of production caused
by the obtrusive observation of that process. The effect was first noticed in the
Hawthorne plant of the Western Electric Company during studies of workplace
behavior in the 1920s and 1930s. Production increased not as a consequence of
actual changes in working conditions introduced by the plant’s management, but
because management demonstrated interest in such improvements. A recent reex-
amination of the Hawthorne data has called into question whether such an effect
actually occurred during the original studies (Jones 1992).
4. This discussion of impact estimation and most of the studies reviewed here focus
on partial equilibrium effects of interventions. That is, they assume away any ex-
ternal validity issues. Among external validity issues, entry and displacement
effects must clearly be accounted for in estimating general equilibrium effects of
interventions. Some ES evaluations have directly accounted for such considera-
tions (Davidson and Woodbury 2000). 
5. A relocation allowance was also available in treatment 2, but it was rarely used. 
6. Data from 6 additional states were deemed inadequate for evaluation. Samples
were originally drawn in 12 states. “Two of these 12 states made errors in imple-
menting their profiling procedures. One inadvertently matched the wrong profil-
ing score to individual claimants’ records; the other incorrectly identified which
claimants had the highest scores. Further, in three additional states we found that
a substantial number of local offices did not systematically refer claimants with
the highest scores to services. None of these states were aware of their implemen-
tation problems” (Dickinson, Decker, and Kreutzer 2002, p. 65). 
7. Two early studies evaluated the effectiveness of counseling provided by the ES
(Benus et al. 1977 and Johnson et al. 1981). Both studies found “no significant
impact of counseling on duration of unemployment, earnings or job satisfaction”
(Balducchi, Johnson, and Gritz 1997, p. 485). 
8. In an interstate study of UI recipiency Vroman (2002, p. ii) finds that states with
established ERI programs have shorter durations of compensated unemployment.
On the technical support Web site for the U.S. Department of Labor, Employment
and Training Administration, links to ERI programs in four states—Florida,
Michigan, Tennessee, West Virgina—are provided under the heading “Best
practices.” <http://www.itsc.state.md.us/Best_ Practices/Eligibility_Review_
Program.htm> (Accessed: July 9, 2003) The states of Georgia and Missouri also
operate ERI programs. 
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